Implementing nuclear non-proliferation in Finland. Regulatory control, international cooperation and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty : Annual report 2009 by Okko O
BSTUK-B 114 / APRIL 2010
Säteilyturvakeskus
Strålsäkerhetscentralen 
Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority
Implementing nuclear 
non-proliferation in Finland 
Regulatory control, international 
cooperation and the Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
Annual report 2009
Olli Okko (ed)
STUK • SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS
STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN
RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY
Osoite/Address • Laippatie 4, 00880 Helsinki
Postiosoite / Postal address • PL / P.O.Box 14, FIN-00881 Helsinki, FINLAND
Puh./Tel. (09) 759 881, +358 9 759 881 • Fax (09) 759 88 500, +358 9 759 88 500 • www.stuk.fi
Implementing nuclear 
non-proliferation in Finland 
Regulatory control, international 
cooperation and the Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
Annual report 2009
Olli Okko (ed)
STUK-B 114 / APRIL 2010
ISBN 978-952-478-529-7 (print) Edita Prima Oy, Finland 2010
ISBN 978-952-478-530-3 (pdf)
ISSN 0781-1713
STUK-B 114
3
Summary
Regulatory control of nuclear materials (nuclear safeguards) is a prerequisite for the 
peaceful use of nuclear energy in Finland. In order to uphold our part of the international 
agreements on nuclear non-proliferation – mainly the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 
– this regulatory control is exercised by the Nuclear Materials Section of the Finnish 
Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK).
Nuclear safeguards are applied to all materials and activities that can lead to the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons or sensitive nuclear technology. These safeguards include 
nuclear materials accountancy, control, security and reporting of nuclear fuel cycle related 
activities. The main parties involved in a state nuclear safeguards system are the facilities 
that use nuclear materials – often referred to as “license holders” or “operators” – and 
the state authority. A license holder shall take good care of its nuclear materials and the 
state authority shall provide the regulatory control to ensure that the license holder does. 
Additionally, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) evaluates the success of the 
state safeguards system and the European Commission (EC) participates in safeguarding 
the materials under its jurisdiction.
To guarantee that Finland can assure itself and the international community of the 
absence of undeclared nuclear activities and materials, STUK maintains a central nuclear 
materials accountancy system and verifies that nuclear activities in Finland are carried 
out according to the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act and Decree, the European Union’s (EU) 
legislation and international agreements.
Finland has a significant nuclear power production, but the related nuclear industry is 
rather limited. About 99.8% of the nuclear materials (uranium, plutonium) in Finland 
reside at the nuclear power plants in Olkiluoto and Loviisa. Most of the remaining 0.2% 
is at the VTT research reactor in Otaniemi, Espoo. Additionally, there are a dozen minor 
nuclear material holders in Finland. The construction project for the final disposal facility 
for spent nuclear fuel does not involve any actual nuclear material yet, but nuclear 
safeguards are applied to the facility site on the national level already, to prepare for 
effective future safeguards. The construction project for the new reactor at Olkiluoto 
is being provided turnkey by the consortium responsible for the delivery. The nuclear 
technology and instrumentation of the new facility are being imported. In 2009 three 
new license applications submitted for nuclear power reactors were reviewed at STUK 
to assure the applicants’ competence to comply with regulatory requirements, including 
the non-proliferation obligations. The results of STUK’s nuclear safeguards inspection 
activities in 2009 continued to demonstrate that Finnish licence holders take good care 
of their nuclear materials. There were no indications of undeclared nuclear materials or 
activities and the inspected materials and activities were in accordance with the licence 
holders’ declarations. STUK remarked on the nuclear safeguards systems of one of the 
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licence holders in 2009, setting required actions to comply with the descriptions of their 
procedures for nuclear material accountancy and control systems. The number of the 
inspection days of the international inspectorates was reduced significantly owing to the 
new state-level integrated safeguards approach for Finland. Neither the IAEA nor the EC 
made any remarks nor did they present any required actions based on their inspections. 
By their nuclear materials accountancy and control systems, all licence holders enabled 
STUK to fulfil its own obligations under the international agreements relevant to nuclear 
safeguards.
The Finnish Ministry of Employment and the Economy invited the IAEA to conduct an 
International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) mission in Finland. The IAEA-
coordinated team identified good practices and gave recommendations and suggestions 
for further improvement. The security-related tasks at several departments of STUK 
were identified, and as a consequence of the mission a new Nuclear Security Section was 
established at the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Department of STUK. Moreover, a threat 
analysis for generating the design basis threat (DBT) was initiated as a joint task of the 
Finnish stakeholders in the fields of nuclear security and safeguards. The resulting DBT 
will be used to guide the physical protection measures.
The human resources development during 2009 was focused on nuclear forensics and 
security issues related to nuclear materials control. A joint collaboration agreement was 
signed between STUK and the Institute of Transuranium Elements (ITU) of the EC Joint 
Research Centre (JRC). STUK and the Finnish Customs continued the joint multi-year 
border monitoring development project. The project covers updating technical equipment 
and operational procedures, and customs officers training. 
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is one of the elements of the 
global nuclear non-proliferation effort. STUK has two roles in relation to the CTBT: 
STUK operates the Finnish National Data Centre (FiNDC) and one of the radionuclide 
laboratories (RL07) designated in the CTBT. The main task of the FiNDC is to inspect 
data received from the International Monitoring System (IMS) and to inform the national 
authority, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, about any indications of a nuclear weapons test. 
The FiNDC falls under the non-proliferation process in STUK’s organisation, together with 
the regulatory control of nuclear materials.
A major goal of all current CTBT related activities is the entry into force of the CTBT itself. 
An important prerequisite for such positive political action is that the verification system 
of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) is functioning and 
able to provide assurance to all parties that it is impossible to make a clandestine nuclear 
test without getting detected. The FiNDC is committed to its own role in the common 
endeavour so that the verification system of the CTBTO can accomplish its detection task.
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Nuclear non-proliferation is a prerequisite for the 
peaceful use of nuclear materials and nuclear ener-
gy, globally. In order for Finland to have a nuclear 
industry, most of which consists of nuclear energy 
production, it must be ensured that nuclear ma-
terials, equipment, and technology are used only 
for their declared, peaceful purposes. The basis for 
nuclear safeguards is the national system for the 
regulatory control of nuclear materials and activi-
ties. Nuclear safeguards are an integral part of nu-
clear safety and nuclear security and they are ap-
plied both to large and medium-size nuclear indus-
try and to small-scale nuclear material activities. 
Along with the safeguards, the regulatory process 
for nuclear non-proliferation includes transport 
control, export control, border control, internation-
al cooperation and conventions, and monitoring 
compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-
Ban Treaty (CTBT).
1.1 International safeguards 
agreements and national legislation
Nuclear safeguards are based on international 
agreements, the most important and extensive of 
which is the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT). 
The Treaty Establishing the European Atomic 
Energy Community (Euratom Treaty) is the basis 
for the nuclear safeguards system of the European 
Union (EU). Finland is bound by both of these trea-
ties, and also has several bilateral agreements in 
the area of peaceful use of nuclear energy. Upon 
joining the EU, Finland’s bilateral agreements with 
Australia, Canada and the USA were partly substi-
tuted by the corresponding Euratom agreements 
(see Appendix 3 for the relevant legislation).
Finland was the first state where an 
1 Nuclear non-proliferation 
implementation in Finland
INFCIRC¹/153-type nuclear Safeguards Agreement 
with the IAEA entered into force (INFCIRC/155, 9 
February 1972). When Finland joined the EU (1 
January 1995), this agreement was suspended and 
subsequently the Safeguards Agreement between 
the non-nuclear weapon Member States of the 
EU, the Euratom, and the IAEA (INFCIRC/193) 
entered into force in Finland, on 1 October 1995. 
Finland signed the Additional Protocol (AP) to 
the INFCIRC/193 in Vienna on 22 September 
1998, with the other EU Member States, and rati-
fied it on 8 August 2000. The Additional Protocol 
entered into force in April 30, 2004, when all the 
EU Member States had ratified it. The scope and 
mandate for Euratom nuclear safeguards are de-
fined in the European Commission Regulation No. 
302/2005.
After Finland joined EU as a Member State, 
and therefore joined the Euratom nuclear safe-
guards, a comprehensive national safeguards sys-
tem was still maintained. The basic motivation for 
this is the responsibility assumed by Finland for 
its nuclear safeguards and nuclear security under 
the obligations of the NPT.
The national nuclear safeguards derive their 
mandate and scope from the Finnish Nuclear 
Energy Act and Decree. These were amended dur-
ing 2008 as a result of the general constitution-
based renewal of the Finnish nuclear legislation 
system. The operator’s obligation to have a nu-
clear material accountancy system and the right 
of STUK to oversee the planning of and genera-
tion of design information for new facilities was 
introduced from STUK regulations to the Decree. 
¹  INFCIRC = IAEA Information Circulars
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The amendment transferred from STUK and the 
Ministry of Employment and the Economy to the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs the export licensing of 
nuclear materials and other nuclear dual use items 
including sensitive nuclear technology.
As stipulated by the Act, STUK issues de-
tailed regulations on safety and security (the yVL 
guides) that apply to the use of nuclear energy. 
The yVL guides most relevant to nuclear safe-
guards are:
•	 Control	of	nuclear	fuel	and	other	nuclear	mate-
rials required in the operation of nuclear power 
plants (guide yVL 6.1)
•	 The	national	system	of	accounting	for	and	con-
trol of nuclear materials (guide yVL 6.9)
•	 Reports	 to	 be	 submitted	 on	 nuclear	materials	
(guide yVL 6.10).
Nuclear materials control applies to:
•	 nuclear	 material	 (special	 fissionable	 material	
and source material)
•	 nuclear	dual	use	items	(non-nuclear	materials,	
components, equipment and data suitable for 
producing nuclear energy or nuclear weapons 
as specified in INFCIRC/254, Part 1)
•	 licence	 holders’	 activities,	 expertise,	 prepared-
ness and competence
•	 R&D	activities	related	to	the	nuclear	fuel	cycle
•	 nuclear	security,	and
•	 safeguards	 for	 the	 final	 disposal	 of	 spent	 nu-
clear fuel.
1.2 Parties of the Finnish nuclear 
safeguards system
The main parties involved in the Finnish nuclear 
safeguards system are the authorities and the li-
cence holders. Undistributed responsibility for the 
safety, security and safeguarding of its nuclear ma-
terials is on the licence holder. It is the responsibil-
ity of STUK as the competent state authority to 
ensure that the licence holders comply with the re-
quirements of the law and the nuclear safeguards 
agreements. To complement the national effort, 
international control is necessary to demonstrate 
credibility and the proper functioning of the na-
tional safeguards system.
1.2.1 Ministries
The Ministry for Foreign Affairs is responsible for 
national non-proliferation policy and international 
agreements. The Ministry of Employment and the 
Economy (MEE) is the highest state authority for 
management and control of nuclear energy. MEE is 
responsible for legislation related to nuclear energy 
and it is also the competent safeguards authority 
mentioned in the Euratom Treaty. Also other min-
istries, such as the Ministry of the Interior and the 
Ministry of Defence contribute to the efficient func-
tioning of the national nuclear safeguards system.
1.2.2 STUK
According to the Finnish nuclear legislation, STUK 
is responsible for maintaining the national nuclear 
safeguards system in order to prevent proliferation 
of nuclear weapons. STUK regulates the license 
holders’ activities and ensures that the obligations 
of international agreements concerning peaceful 
use of nuclear materials are met. Regulatory con-
trol by STUK includes the possession, use, produc-
tion, transfer (national and international), han-
dling, storage, transport, export and import of nu-
clear material and nuclear dual use items. STUK 
is in charge of Finland’s approval and consultation 
process for IAEA and European Commission in-
spectors. STUK approves an inspector as long as 
there are no such issues related to the person in 
question that might adversely affect nuclear safety 
or security at Finnish facilities or the non-prolif-
eration of nuclear weapons. The new inspector re-
quests are sent for comments to the operators that 
hold construction or operating licenses for nuclear 
facilities. If STUK cannot approve an inspector, 
it assigns the approval process to the Ministry of 
Employment and the Economy.
Nuclear safeguards by the Nuclear Materials 
Section of STUK (see Figure 1 for the organisa-
tional chart and Figure 9 for the staff) cover all 
typical measures of a State System of Accounting 
for and Control of Nuclear Materials (SSAC), and 
many other activities besides. STUK reviews the 
license holders’ reports (operational notifications, 
inventory reports), inspects their accountancy, fa-
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cilities and transport arrangements on site, and 
performs system audits. Office work constitutes 
90% of the inspection effort. STUK runs a verifi-
cation programme for nuclear activities to assess 
the completeness and correctness of the declara-
tions by the licence holders. Nuclear safeguards 
on the national level are closely linked with other 
functions of nuclear materials control and non-
proliferation: licensing, export control, border con-
trol, transport control, combating illicit trafficking, 
the physical protection of nuclear materials, and 
monitoring compliance with the Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) – all duties of the 
STUK Nuclear Materials Section. Nuclear safety 
and particularly nuclear security objectives are 
closely complemented by safeguards objectives.
1.2.3 License holders
Essential parts of the national nuclear safeguards 
system are the licence holders, in nuclear terminol-
ogy often called the operators. They perform key 
functions of the national safeguards system: con-
trol of the authentic source data of their nuclear 
materials and accountancy of nuclear material at 
the facility level for each of their material balance 
areas (MBA). Each license holders has to operate 
its safeguards system according to its own nuclear 
materials handbook. The handbook is a part of the 
facility’s quality system and is reviewed and ap-
proved by STUK.
With the basic technical characteristics (BTC) 
submitted by a license holder as groundwork, 
the European Commission shall adopt particu-
lar safeguards provisions (PSP) for that license 
holder. PSP are to be drawn taking into account 
operational and technical constraints and in close 
consultation with both the person or undertaking 
concerned and the relevant member state. Until 
PSP are adopted, the person or undertaking shall 
apply the general provisions of the Commission 
regulation No 302/2005.
99.8% of all nuclear materials in Finland reside 
Figure 1. The Nuclear Materials Section and the Finnish National Data Centre for the CTBT within the STUK or-
ganisational structure.
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at the nuclear power plants (NPP). The nuclear 
material (uranium, plutonium) amounts in Finland 
in 1991–2009 are presented in Figures 2 and 3.
Fortum (MBA WL0V)
Fortum is a partly state-owned energy company, 
one of the largest in the Nordic countries. Fortum 
operates power plants of several types, nuclear 
among others.
The nuclear power plant of Fortum Power and 
heat is located on the hästholmen Island in 
Loviisa on the south-east coast of Finland. This 
first NPP to have been built in Finland hosts 
two power reactor units: Loviisa 1 and Loviisa 2. 
Loviisa 1 started its electricity production in 1977 
and Loviisa 2 in 1980. The two units share a com-
mon fresh and spent fuel storage and for nuclear 
safeguards accountancy purposes the whole NPP 
is counted as one material balance area (MBA code 
WL0V). The electricity generated by the Loviisa 
NPP constitutes ca. 10% of the whole electricity 
production in Finland.
Most of the fuel for the Loviisa NPP has 
been imported from the Soviet Union / Russian 
Federation. The spent fuel of the Loviisa NPP was 
returned to the Soviet Union / Russian Federation 
until 1996 and since then the spent fuel has been 
stored in the interim storage due to a change in the 
Finnish nuclear legislation, which today forbids, in 
general, import and export of nuclear waste.
Particular Safeguards Provisions for the Loviisa 
NPP, which define the European Commission’s nu-
clear safeguards procedures for the facility, have 
been in force since 1998.
The Loviisa NPP site, as per the requirements 
of the Additional Protocol, comprises the entire 
hästholmen Island and extends to the main gate 
on the continent.
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Figure 3. Plutonium amount in Finland in 1991–2009.
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Figure 2. Uranium amount in Finland in 1991–2009.
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Teollisuuden Voima (MBAs W0L1, 
W0L2, W0LS and W0L3)
Teollisuuden Voima Oyj (TVO) owns and operates 
a nuclear power plant on the Olkiluoto Island in 
Eurajoki on the west coast of Finland. The Olkiluoto 
NPP consists of two nuclear power reactor units, 
Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2, and an interim spent 
fuel storage. Olkiluoto 1 was connected to the elec-
tricity grid in 1978 and Olkiluoto 2 in 1980. The 
Olkiluoto NPP contributes ca. 16% of the whole 
electricity production in Finland. At the Olkiluoto 
NPP there are three active material balance areas 
(MBA codes W0L1, W0L2, W0LS).
Presently, the uranium in TVO’s nuclear fuel 
is mainly of Australian, Canadian and Russian 
origin. This uranium is enriched in the Russian 
Federation or in the EU and the fuel assemblies 
are manufactured in Spain and Sweden.
The Finnish government granted a licence for 
constructing a new nuclear reactor, Olkiluoto 3, 
on 17 February 2005. As a part of the licensing 
process, TVO’s plan for arranging the necessary 
measures for preventing proliferation of nuclear 
weapons was approved by STUK. The construction 
and assembly work of the reactor unit is underway. 
The European Commission has assigned the MBA 
code W0L3 for Olkiluoto 3.
TVO owns most of the area of the Olkiluoto 
Island, but the NPP site, as per the requirements 
of the Additional Protocol, comprises the fenced 
areas around the reactor units, the spent fuel stor-
age and the storage for low and intermediate level 
waste as well as the Olkiluoto 3 construction site.
VTT FiR1 research reactor (MBA WRRF)
Small amounts of nuclear materials are located at 
facilities other than nuclear power plants. The most 
significant of those facilities is the VTT research re-
actor FiR1 (MBA code WRRF) in Otaniemi, Espoo. 
The research reactor was the first nuclear reactor 
built in Finland. It reached criticality on 27 March 
1962.
Particular Safeguards Provisions that define 
the European Commission’s nuclear safeguards 
procedures for the facility have been in force for 
VTT FiR1 from 1998.
The VTT FiR1 site, as per the requirements of 
the Additional Protocol, consists of the whole build-
ing around the research reactor, although there are 
non-nuclear companies and university premises in 
the same building.
STUK (MBA WFRS)
Small quantities of nuclear materials are stored 
by the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety 
Authority (STUK), mainly material no longer in 
use and hence taken into STUK’s custody. STUK 
was founded in 1958 and is located at its cur-
rent premises in Roihupelto, helsinki since 1994. 
The STUK MBA (WFRS) consists of the STUK 
headquarters and the “Central interim storage for 
small-user radioactive waste” at the Olkiluoto NPP 
site.
The STUK site, as per the requirements of the 
Additional Protocol, consists of the whole build-
ing where STUK’s headquarters are located in 
helsinki, but non-STUK premises in the building 
are excluded. The storage at Olkiluoto is included 
in the NPP’s site declaration.
The University of Helsinki, Laboratory 
of Radiochemistry (MBA WHEL)
The Laboratory of Radiochemistry at the University 
of helsinki (hyRL) uses small amounts of nuclear 
materials. hyRL is located at the Kumpula univer-
sity campus in helsinki.
The hyRL site, as per the requirements of the 
Additional Protocol, comprises the whole building 
that hosts the laboratory.
OMG Kokkola Chemicals (MBA WKK0)
The OMg Kokkola Chemicals facility does not use 
nuclear materials as such. however, the by-prod-
ucts of their cobalt purification process contain 
uranium, which qualifies these by-products as nu-
clear material. OMg Kokkola Chemicals has an 
operation license for production, storing and han-
dling nuclear material. OMg Kokkola Chemicals is 
located on the west coast of Finland.
Other nuclear material holders
There are about 10 minor nuclear material holders 
in Finland. One of them is an actual material bal-
ance area: University of Jyväskylä, Department of 
Physics (JyFL, MBA code WDPJ), but in fact the 
nuclear material in JyFL has been derogated and 
exempted by the European Commission and the 
IAEA. Other minor nuclear material holders are 
12
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members of a Catch-All-MBA (CAM), for purposes 
of international nuclear safeguards. Most of these 
have depleted uranium as radiation shielding ma-
terial.
Posiva (MBA W0LF)
Posiva Oy is the company responsible for the fi-
nal disposal of spent nuclear fuel in Finland. It is 
owned by TVO and Fortum. Posiva has been exca-
vating an underground rock characterisation facili-
ty called “Onkalo” in Eurajoki since 2004, and thus 
preparing for the construction of the final disposal 
facility. While neither a license holder nor a nucle-
ar material holder yet, Posiva and its activities are 
highly relevant to the national safeguards system 
because Posiva is foreseen to develop a new type of 
facility, the geological repository, where the nuclear 
material cannot be re-verified once it has been en-
capsulated and emplaced. In the IAEA safeguards 
approaches it has been suggested that the geo-
logical formation should be under safeguards dur-
ing the whole lifetime of the underground facility. 
Therefore, Posiva has been required to develop a 
non-proliferation handbook, such as a nuclear ma-
terials handbook, to describe Posiva’s safeguards 
procedures and reporting system already before 
becoming a nuclear material holder. The European 
Commission has already at this early stage as-
signed the MBA code W0LF for Onkalo.
1.3 IAEA and Euratom 
safeguards in Finland
The IAEA and the European Commission nuclear 
safeguards both have their separate mandates to 
operate in Finland. These two international in-
spectorates have agreed on cooperation (New 
Partnership Approach, NPA), which aims to reduce 
undue duplication of effort. year 2009 introduced a 
significant change from the traditional safeguards 
procedures in Finland as the implementation of 
integrated safeguards began on 15 October 2008. 
The state-level safeguards approach for Finland 
reduces the number of annual inspection days of 
international organisations from 25 days to less 
than 15, and relies more on the national compe-
tent authority. This change is described in detail in 
Chapter 2.
1.4 Verified declarations for 
state evaluations
A state’s declarations on its nuclear materials and 
activities are the basis for the state evaluation by 
the IAEA under the obligations of the Additional 
Protocol. In Finland, the state has delegated its re-
sponsibility for these declarations to STUK. STUK 
has been nominated a site representative, as per 
European Commission regulation No 302/2005. 
STUK collects, inspects and reviews the relevant 
information and then submits the compiled decla-
rations timely to the Commission and the IAEA.
In Finland, there are five sites in the sense of the 
Additional Protocol: the two nuclear power plant 
(NPP) sites: the Olkiluoto NPP and the Loviisa 
NPP, and three minor sites: VTT, STUK and the 
Laboratory of Radiochemistry at the University of 
helsinki. STUK reviews and verifies the correct-
ness and completeness of the information about 
the sites provided by the license holders.
STUK reviews annually the information about 
research and development activities that might be 
eligible for declaration, as well as activities speci-
fied in Annex I of the Additional Protocol. STUK 
maintains the information on general plans related 
to the nuclear fuel cycle for the next 10 years and 
keeps account of the exports of specified equipment 
and non-nuclear materials, as listed in Annex II of 
the Additional Protocol.
Technical analysis methods are one tool for a 
state nuclear safeguards system to ensure that nu-
clear materials and activities within the state are 
in accordance with the licence holders’ declarations 
and that there are no undeclared activities. Such 
methods can provide information on the identity 
of the nuclear materials and confirm that licence 
holders’ declarations are correct and complete with 
respect to e.g. the enrichment of uranium, the bur-
nup, and the cooling time of nuclear fuel. The tech-
nical analysis methods in use are non-destructive 
assay (NDA) and environmental sampling and 
satellite imagery.
STUK employs three NDA methods for verify-
ing spent nuclear fuel. One method lends itself for 
rapid scanning, as the detector is mounted on the 
fuel transfer machine and the fuel elements can be 
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measured from above the fuel pond without moving 
the elements. The other two methods, on the other 
hand, allow confirming with greater confidence the 
correctness of the declared burnup and the cooling 
time. With the most precise method, the absence of 
a fuel pin or pins from a fuel element can be dis-
covered. STUK reports to the Commission and the 
IAEA about the NDA measurement campaigns.
All nuclear materials leave traces of their iden-
tity, source of origin and treatment. Safeguards 
environmental samples (ES) are used to investi-
gate these traces, which provide further clarity in 
establishing whether the nuclear activities are in 
accordance with the declarations. In the Finnish 
nuclear safeguards system environmental samples 
are collected as surface swipes. The IAEA may col-
lect independent environmental samples during its 
complementary access type of inspections.
Satellite imagery is applied to verify the site 
declaration pursuant to the Additional Protocol. 
Timely imagery is used to monitor different kinds 
of activities at the sites or elsewhere in Finland. 
STUK purchases commercial images and contrib-
utes to the work of satellite image analysts of the 
IAEA and the Commission.
1.5 Export/import control and 
licensing as elements of 
nuclear non-proliferation
According to the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act, in 
addition to nuclear materials also other nuclear 
fuel cycle related activities are under regulatory 
control. A license is required for possession, trans-
fer and import of components, equipment, materi-
als and technology suitable for producing nuclear 
energy (nuclear dual use items).
The list of these other items is based on Nuclear 
Suppliers’ group (NSg) guidelines (INFCIRC/254 
Part 1). The license holder is required to provide 
STUK annually with a list of the above mentioned 
items. Moreover, the export, import, and transfer of 
such items shall be reported to STUK.
Mining and enrichment operations that aim 
to produce uranium or thorium are also under 
nuclear safeguards and regulatory nuclear safety 
control. A company or a person carrying out these 
activities shall have a license and an accounting 
system to keep track of the amounts of uranium 
and thorium. A license is also required to export 
and import uranium or thorium ore and these 
activities shall be reported to STUK and to the 
European Commission.
Finland’s export control system is based on 
the EU Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 of 
5 May 2009 setting up a Community regime for 
the control of exports, transfer, brokering and 
transit of dual-use items. The export of Nuclear 
Suppliers’ group (NSg) Part 1 and Part 2 items 
is regulated by the Finnish Act on the Control of 
Exports of Dual Use goods. The licensing authority 
is the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. An authoriza-
tion is required to export nuclear items outside the 
European Union. A license is also required for EU 
internal transfers of NSg Part 1 items, excluding 
non-sensitive nuclear materials.
1.6 The regulatory control of transport 
covers nuclear materials
The requirements for the transport of radioactive 
material are set in the Finnish regulations on the 
transport of dangerous goods. The requirements 
are based on the IAEA safety standard Regulations 
for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, TS-
R-1, and their purpose is to protect people, envi-
ronment and property from the harmful effects of 
radiation during the transport of radioactive mate-
rial. Based on these regulations, STUK is the com-
petent national authority for the regulatory control 
regarding the transport of radioactive material.
In addition to the dangerous goods transport 
regulations, the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act sets 
specific requirements for the transport of nuclear 
material: a licence granted by STUK is needed for 
such a transport. Usually the transport licences are 
granted for a fixed period, typically for a few years. 
A transport plan and a security plan approved by 
STUK are mandatory for each transport of nuclear 
material. A certificate of nuclear liability insurance 
shall also be delivered to STUK before the trans-
port. Furthermore, a package may be used for the 
transport of fissile nuclear material only after the 
package design has been approved by STUK.
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1.7 STUK’s contribution to international 
safeguards development
Nuclear non-proliferation is, by its nature, an inter-
national domain. STUK therefore actively partici-
pates in international nuclear safeguards related 
cooperation and development efforts.
STUK is a member of the European Safeguards 
Research and Development Association (ESARDA), 
and has nominated Finnish experts to its commit-
tees and most of the working groups. STUK partic-
ipates in the ESARDA Executive Board meetings 
and the Presidency of ESARDA is currently held 
by a STUK representative.
STUK’s expert participates in the work of the 
Atomic Questions group (AQg) of the Council 
of the European Union and contributes to the 
Safeguards Experts meetings.
The Standing Advisory group on Safeguards 
Implementation (SAgSI) comprises a group of nu-
clear safeguards experts from the IAEA Member 
States, appointed by the IAEA Director general 
to advise on safeguards implementation issues. 
One of the experts in this group is a STUK staff 
member.
Upon request by the IAEA, STUK’s experts have 
contributed to the IAEA’s international evaluation 
missions, such as the International SSAC Advisory 
Service (ISSAS). The ISSAS mission reviews State 
Systems of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear 
Materials (SSAC) and provides suggestions for im-
proving them.
STUK keeps close contacts with the respective 
Nordic authority organisations. The development 
of the final disposal of spent nuclear fuel in geologi-
cal repositories deepens the cooperation between 
Finland and Sweden.
1.8 The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-
Ban Treaty: a global technology-
based non-proliferation tool
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
(CTBT) is an important part of the international 
regime for the non-proliferation of nuclear weap-
ons. The CTBT bans any nuclear weapon test ex-
plosions in any environment. This ban is aimed 
at constraining the development and qualitative 
improvement of nuclear weapons, including also 
the development of advanced new types of nuclear 
weapons.
The CTBT was adopted by the United Nations 
general Assembly, and was opened for signature 
in New york on 24 September 1996. The CTBT 
will enter into force after it has been ratified by 
the 44 states listed in its Annex 2. These 44 states 
participated in the 1996 session of the Conference 
on Disarmament and possess nuclear power or re-
search reactors.
A global verification regime is being established 
in order to monitor compliance with the CTBT. The 
verification regime consists of the following ele-
ments: the International Monitoring System (IMS), 
a consultation and clarification process, on-site in-
spections and confidence-building measures.
Finland has signed and ratified the CTBT. In 
addition to complying with the basic requirement 
of the CTBT of not to carry out any nuclear weap-
ons tests, Finland takes part in the development of 
the verification regime.
In the CTBT framework, the Finnish national 
authority is the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. STUK 
has two roles: STUK operates the Finnish National 
Data Centre (FiNDC) and one of the radionuclide 
laboratories (RL07) designated in the CTBT. The 
main task of the FiNDC is to inspect data received 
from the IMS and inform the national authority 
about any indications of a nuclear weapons test. 
The radionuclide laboratory contributes to the IMS 
by providing support in the radionuclide analyses 
and in the quality control of the radionuclide sta-
tion network. The third major national collaborator 
is the Institute of Seismology at the University of 
helsinki, which runs an IMS seismology station 
(PS17 in Lahti), and provides analysis of waveform 
IMS data (Figure 4).
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban 
Treaty (CTBT) Status (31.12.2009)
•	 CTBT	Member	States	 182
•	 Total	Ratifications	 151
•	 Annex	2	Ratifications	 35
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1.9 Nuclear safeguards and nuclear 
security have much in common
STUK is the national authority for the regulatory 
control of nuclear and radiological safety, security 
and safeguards. All these three regimes are means 
to a common end: protection of people, society, envi-
ronment and future generations from the harmful 
effects of ionising radiation. From the definition of 
nuclear security, as referred to in the IAEA Nuclear 
Security Plan 2006–2009 (see infobox below), it is 
clear that the majority of the activities that aim at 
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, nuclear ma-
terials and sensitive nuclear technology contribute 
to nuclear security. Moreover, such classical ele-
ments of security as physical protection of nuclear 
materials and facilities contribute to non-prolif-
eration. Within STUK’s organisation, some of its 
nuclear security related tasks fall – solely or partly 
– under the duties of the nuclear non-proliferation 
process and the Nuclear Materials Section:
•	 national	system	 for	 the	control	of	nuclear	ma-
terials and nuclear dual use items facilitating 
international nuclear safeguards activities in 
Finland
•	 regulatory	 control	 of	 the	 transport	 of	 nuclear	
materials
•	 import	and	export	control
•	 advice	 to	 the	 Finnish	 Customs	 on	 radiation	
monitoring at the borders, in concept develop-
ment and technical specifications; training for 
Customs officers
•	 participation	 in	 the	 work	 of	 the	 international	
nuclear safeguards and nuclear security com-
munities and working groups (IAEA, ESARDA, 
AQg, ITWg…)
•	 participation	 in	 STUK’s	 response	 in	 cases	 of	
radiological or nuclear incidents
•	 advice	to	the	Finnish	Customs	on	interpretation	
of radiation detections at borders, more sophis-
ticated on-site measurements and analyses in 
response to border monitoring alarms.
Figure 4. The Finnish CTBT organisation.
Definition of nuclear security: The prevention 
and	 detection	 of	 and	 response	 to	 theft,	 sabotage,	
unauthorized access, illegal transfer or other mali-
cious acts involving nuclear material, other ra-
dioactive	 substances	 or	 their	 associated	 facilities	
(working	definition	 established	by	 the	fifth	meet-
ing of the Advisory Group on Nuclear Security 
1–5	December	2005)	[IAEA	Nuclear	Security	Plan	
2006–2009].
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2 Themes of the year 2009
2.1 First year with IAEA 
Integrated Safeguards
The IAEA’s integrated nuclear safeguards entered 
into force in Finland on 15 October 2008. The inter-
national organisations, the IAEA and the European 
Commission, performed their inspections according 
to the annual schedule throughout the year 2008. 
The number of the routine inspections decreased in 
2009 significantly as defined in the state-level safe-
guards approach for Finland, which was negotiated 
during 2007 and 2008 (see infobox). The time dif-
ference between the unannounced inspections at 
the two spent fuel storages (i.e. 2 hours for Loviisa 
and 48 hours for Olkiluoto) is due to the difference 
in the surveillance at the storages and reasonable 
access time for a STUK inspector. The notifica-
tion time will be harmonised to 24 hours after the 
installation of new surveillance equipment at the 
Loviisa storage.
Integrated safeguards include traditional nu-
clear safeguards as per INFCIRC/193, and safe-
guards activities in accordance with the Additional 
Protocol, fitted together. While this should not lead 
to an increase in inspections, it should enable the 
IAEA to assure itself of the absence of undeclared 
nuclear activities in a state. In practice, the number 
of IAEA routine interim inspections decreases. In 
contrast to this, the IAEA will additionally perform 
1–3 unannounced inspections per year in a state 
that has a number and type of nuclear installa-
tions that resembles the situation in Finland.
STUK has organised information meetings on 
the effects of integrated safeguards for the nuclear 
power plant operators and preparatory trilateral 
meetings with the IAEA and the Commission 
since 2007. The implementation procedures were 
reviewed at four meetings held in Vienna 12 
February, 24 June, 5 November, and 10 December 
2009, and one meeting held in Luxembourg 17 
March 2009. In the meanwhile, the operators up-
dated their handbooks in order to incorporate the 
necessary actions for the new types of inspections. 
STUK also increased preparedness for short notice 
and unannounced inspections and complementary 
access (unofficially called SNUICA). One of STUK’s 
inspectors is daily prepared to attend, on alert, to 
a possible IAEA inspection. On 26 February 2009 
the IAEA made an unannounced test to assure the 
performance of the procedures and precautions for 
the alert of an unannounced inspection.
The number of the IAEA and commission per-
son days is presented in Figure 6. As the result of 
the new approaches the international organisa-
tions performed 11 and 13 inspection days in 2009, 
which is a significant reduction to the previous 
IAEA regular inspections:
Facilities	at	nuclear	power	plants	(NPP):
•	 Physical	Inventory	Verification	(PIV)	/	Design	
Information	Verification	(DIV)	1/year
•	 Random	 Interim	 Inspection	 (RII)	 at	 24/48	h	
notification	(at	least	1/year)
Spent	fuel	storages	at	NPPs
•	 PIV/DIV	1/year
•	 RII	at	2h	i.e.	Unannounced	Inspection	(UI)/48h	
notification	(at	least	1/year)
Research reactor and locations outside facilities 
(LOF)
•	 PIV/DIV	1/4-6	years
New reactor (OL3), under construction
•	 DIV	and	PIV	later	like	at	the	NPPs
Repository (Onkalo), under construction
•	 PIV/DIV	most	likely	as	at	SF	storages
Complementary	accesses	at	2/24	h	notification	to	
verify declared activities or to detect undeclared 
activities.
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number of 25–26 inspection days. The on-alert 
“SNUICA” inspector of STUK attended to two 
short notice random inspections and to one com-
plementary access. The national State Systems of 
Accounting for and Control (SSAC) continued with 
annual routines with approximately 40 inspec-
tions, which enabled the reduction in the effort of 
the international inspectorates. In the future the 
role of SSAC may be strengthened, e.g. by enabling 
remote inspections and substituting the interna-
tional inspectors to a certain extent.
2.2 Applications for new facilities, 
safeguards in design
Three power companies submitted their applica-
tion for a Decision-in-Principle to construct new 
nuclear power plants in Finland. Both existing nu-
clear power companies TVO and Fortum applied 
for a new reactor at their power stations; whereas 
the newcomer, Fennovoima applied for one or two 
reactors at a new power station site. The company 
indicated 3 candidates for the new site. Later in the 
year 2009 the number of potential candidates was 
reduced to 2, both located on the shoreline of the 
Bothnian Bay. The nuclear future in Finland was 
discussed in public during the whole year 2009, 
and a decision is expected to be prepared at the 
Ministry for Employment and the Economy in the 
beginning of 2010. During 2009 STUK reviewed 
the applications for nuclear safety, security, safe-
guards etc. as defined in the Nuclear Energy Act. 
The plan to conduct the non-proliferation control 
was reviewed by the Nuclear Materials Section.
New applications for a Decision-in-Principle 
were submitted to the Finnish government by 
Posiva for the purpose of enlarging the geological 
repository at Olkiluoto to such an extent that cov-
ers the rock volume needed to dispose of the spent 
fuel of the proposed new reactor units of the own-
ers of Posiva; i.e. the Loviisa 3 and Olkiluoto 4 re-
actors. The Nuclear Material Section assured that 
the applicant has the required competence to carry 
out nuclear non-proliferation control.
The new applications and practices obtained at 
the current construction sites in Olkiluoto clearly 
pointed out the need to bring in the safeguards 
requirement at an early stage of facility design. 
The early design information is generated, in prin-
ciple, before the construction, but when planning 
the installation of containment and surveillance 
equipment and cabling, some of the desired pre-
cautions were missing both at the Olkiluoto 3 and 
the Onkalo facilities since they were not indicated 
on the official documents early enough. In order to 
improve and facilitate the future implementation 
of safeguards at new facilities STUK joined the 
Safeguards by Design Support Programme of the 
IAEA.
2.3 The IPPAS mission to strengthen 
the non-proliferation and physical 
protection regimes at STUK
The IAEA provides a service of international advi-
sory missions for the benefit of the state regimes for 
nuclear safety, security and safeguards. These peer 
reviews are a way for a state to receive feedback in 
order to continue development and to create trans-
parency and trust. At the end of 2008 the Finnish 
Ministry of Employment and the Economy invited 
the IAEA to conduct an International Physical 
Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) mission in 
Finland. The goal was to get an independent assess-
ment of the national nuclear security infrastruc-
ture: of planning, implementation and regulatory 
control of security in the use of nuclear energy and 
in the use of radiation. The IAEA-coordinated team 
carried out the mission – mainly on the state-level 
arrangements – in the summer of 2009. It identi-
fied good practices and gave recommendations and 
suggestions for further improvement. The coopera-
tion between the security authorities was on a high 
level, and some suggestions were made to improve 
and clarify the guidelines and requirements and to 
focus more to unannounced inspections. The mis-
sion was considered useful, and the work is under 
way to take advantage of its results.
The security-related tasks at several depart-
ments of STUK were both self-assessed and re-
viewed by the IPPAS mission; and as consequence 
of the mission’s recommendations, a new Nuclear 
Security Section was established at the Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation Department of STUK. The 
safeguards-related tasks of the nuclear non-pro-
liferation regime are handled in cooperation with 
this new office. Moreover, a threat analysis for gen-
erating the design basis threat (DBT) was initiated 
as a joint task of the Finnish stakeholders in the 
field of nuclear security. These include, in addition 
to the nuclear stakeholders, the Police Department 
of the Ministry of the Interior, which is in charge of 
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the Finnish chemical, biological, radiological, and 
nuclear (CBRN) task force. The purpose of the task 
force is to advance measures to deter, prevent, de-
tect and respond to illicit CBRN activities.
2.4 RADAR – a joint development 
project by Finnish 
Customs and STUK
Cooperation between STUK and the Finnish 
Customs is close: in 2009 these authorities had a 
budget of 0.9 M€ to spend on upgrading and invest-
ing in new equipment for the use of the Finnish 
Customs. The project, called RADAR, is expected 
to continue until 2014. The RADAR project covers 
maintaining and updating technical equipment, 
training customs officers, as well as developing 
operational procedures, such as data transfer to 
enable swift off-site analysis. While the implemen-
tation of radiation monitoring at the Finnish bor-
ders is fully under the jurisdiction of the Finnish 
Customs, STUK’s role is to provide expert advice. 
This long-standing cooperation involves concept 
planning, technical specifications and operations: 
interpretation of alarms and analysis of measure-
ment results.
In 2009 RADAR invested in neutron measure-
ment capability at the Finnish–Russian Border. 
A number of equipment electronics were also up-
graded. A second major investment was purchasing 
a hand held spectral personal radiation devices 
(SPRD) for customs use. There were two radiation 
detections at borders in 2009, reported to STUK by 
the Finnish Customs. The detections were caused 
by routine medical nuclides in travellers.
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3 Safeguards activities in 2009
3.1 The regulatory control of 
nuclear materials
The application of integrated safeguards began in 
Finland on 15 October 2008. Thus, in the year 2009 
the number of the IAEA inspections was reduced 
from the approximately 25 person days to 15. 
Similarly, the European Commission reduced its 
inspection activities significantly. STUK continued 
with national safeguards measures as in the past. 
Nuclear material inventories at the end of 2009 are 
shown in Tables 2 and 3 and in Appendix 1. The 
development of inspections and inspection person 
days is presented in Figures 5 and 6. Inspections of 
STUK, the IAEA and the Commission in 2009 are 
presented in Table 4 (Appendix 2). 
3.1.1 Declarations and approvals of 
new international inspectors
All the relevant license holders sent their updated 
information for the national declaration, which is 
compiled by STUK, in time by 1 March 2009. STUK 
submitted Finland’s annual declaration updates to 
the IAEA on 14 May 2009 as required. In addi-
tion STUK submitted the quarterly declarations on 
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Figure 6. Inspection person days from 2004 to 2009.
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exports in February, May, August and November.
In 2009, altogether 44 IAEA and 6 Commission 
new inspectors were approved to perform inspec-
tions at nuclear facilities in Finland. In addition 
to these, STUK informed the operators about one 
Commission inspector who had already been ap-
proved to Non Nuclear Weapons States.
3.1.2 The Loviisa nuclear power plant site
In 2009, STUK accepted Loviisa nuclear power 
plant’s (NPP) updated nuclear materials handbook. 
STUK granted the operating company Fortum two 
import licenses for nuclear dual use items, i.e. in-
strumentation
The refuelling and maintenance outage of the 
Loviisa 1 reactor unit took place in the peri-
od 23 August – 9 September 2009 and that of 
the Loviisa 2 reactor unit in the period 12–30 
September 2009. Owing to the new integrated 
safeguards approach for Finland, the IAEA and 
the Commission performed a pre-inspection with 
STUK before the outage, on 18 August 2009, and 
the physical inventory verification (PIV) after the 
outage, on 6–7 October 2009. During the outage 
and before the closing of each reactor, STUK iden-
tified the fuel assemblies in the reactor cores and 
item counted the loading ponds. The Loviisa 1 core 
was inspected on 31 August 2009 and the Loviisa 
2 core on 21 September 2009. In addition to the 
PIV and the core controls, STUK carried out four 
routine inspections. No IAEA/Commission random 
interim inspection took place at the Loviisa facility 
in 2009.
There were a few technical malfunctions and 
human errors that delayed the refuelling and in-
spections at the Loviisa facility. During the Loviisa 
1 core inspection it was observed that one absorber 
was missing in the core, although it had been man-
ually reported and inspected by the operator. The 
failure was noticed the missing assembly moved 
to its location, and precautions made to avoid the 
same mistake in the future. Changes in the opera-
tor’s procedures were requested before the refuel-
ling of the Loviisa 2 unit.
The whole Loviisa 2 core was unloaded to iden-
tify leaking fuel assemblies that were observed 
during the operational period. One leaking fuel 
assembly was identified and replaced. There were 
technical shortcomings with the fuel handling 
machine in the Loviisa 1 unit, wherefore the out-
age was delayed. During the PIV inspection on 6 
October the crane in the spent fuel storage failed, 
and all of the fuel ponds could not be verified. The 
non-accessible pond was sealed in order to facili-
tate a short re-inspection. The crane was repaired 
by October 20, and the re-inspection will take place 
19-20 January 2010. During the inspection new 
surveillance cameras were installed at the spent 
fuel storage. This allows changes and simplifica-
tions in the integrated safeguards approach for the 
Loviisa NPP in the future.
At the Loviisa NPP STUK performed two non-
destructive assay (NDA) verification measurement 
campaigns on spent fuel elements in 2009. The 
first campaign, 24–25 March, was carried out with 
FORK equipment, which delivers a gross gamma 
signal from an ionisation chamber and a neutron 
count rate from a fission chamber. STUK’s FORK 
equipment is sometimes referred to as eFORK (en-
hanced FORK), because it incorporates a CdZnTe-
gamma spectrometer. Measurements were made 
on four spent fuel elements. This was less than 
the planned number of elements, as equipment 
malfunction forced an early termination of the 
measurements. To compensate for this, the number 
of elements to be measured in the second campaign 
was increased.
The second NDA campaign, 19–20 August, was 
carried out with upgraded spent fuel attribute test-
er (SFAT) equipment with a CdZnTe-gamma spec-
trometer. Traditionally, a SFAT device is equipped 
with a lower resolution NaI detector. Altogether 
102 fuel elements were verified. The verification 
results were archived in the STUK NDA meas-
urement database developed for the purpose. The 
measurements and the environmental samples 
collected at the Loviisa NPP did not indicate any 
inconsistencies in the reporting by the operator.
On the basis of its own assessment as well as of 
IAEA and Commission inspection results, STUK 
concluded that Fortum’s Loviisa NPP has complied 
with its nuclear safeguards obligations in 2009, 
although the full PIV was still pending.
3.1.3 The Olkiluoto nuclear power plant site
In 2009, STUK approved one new person to be ap-
pointed responsible for nuclear safeguards at the 
Olkiluoto NPP. During 2009 STUK also granted 
to the TVO one export and eight import licences. 
These covered the import of fresh nuclear fuel and 
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nuclear dual use items, i.e. technology and instru-
mentation for the operating units and export of two 
spent fuel rods for research purpose. Furthermore, 
one licence was granted for transfer of depleted 
uranium samples to STUK.
The refuelling and maintenance outage of the 
Olkiluoto 1 reactor unit took place in the period 
3–12 May 2009 and that of the Olkiluoto 2 reactor 
unit in the period 13–30 May 2009. Similarly to 
the Loviisa NPP, the IAEA and the Commission 
performed a pre-inspection with STUK 28–29 April 
2009, before the outage, and the physical inven-
tory verification (PIV) after the outage, 2–4 June 
2009. The IAEA carried out complementary access 
on 29 April, most likely in order to complete the 
previous complementary access to the waste treat-
ment buildings at site. In addition, the random 
interim inspections to Finland were addressed to 
the Olkiluoto NPP: on 18 March 2009 to the spent 
fuel storage and on 18 November to the Olkiluoto 2 
unit.
During the refuelling and maintenance outage 
STUK identified the fuel assemblies in the reactor 
cores and verified/item counted the loading ponds 
before the reactors were closed. The Olkiluoto 1 
reactor was inspected on 9 May 2009 and the 
Olkiluoto 2 reactor on 27 May 2009. The outage 
and the core verification at Olkiluoto 2 were de-
layed for a day and a half owing to a failure in the 
fuel handling machine. STUK carried out four rou-
tine inspections for the Olkiluoto site and each of 
the material balance areas (MBA) at the Olkiluoto 
NPP.
At the Olkiluoto NPP STUK performed only one 
non-destructive assay (NDA) verification measure-
ment campaign on spent fuel elements in 2009. 
During the campaign STUK performed gamma 
Burnup Verification (gBUV) measurements at the 
Olkiluoto spent fuel storage 15–17 April 2009. 
Altogether 25 spent fuel assemblies were verified. 
The results were archived in the mobile version of 
the NDA measurement database.
A second measurement campaign was planned 
in Olkiluoto plant using a new tomographic meas-
urement device, which is expected to be able to 
detect the removal of a single fuel rod from the as-
sembly. Checks of this accuracy are needed before 
the assembly can be placed in the final repository 
for spent nuclear fuel, and the new device has been 
developed especially for this purpose. however, 
problems in the final phase of preparing the device 
meant that the planned campaign had to be post-
poned to early 2010. The measurement campaign 
performed at the Olkiluoto NPP did not indicate 
any inconsistencies in the reporting by the opera-
tor.
The construction of the new Olkiluoto 3 reactor 
(OL3) has proceeded to such a stage that nuclear 
items are to be imported to the site. The turbine 
hall with its instrumentation proceeds well, but 
the reactor building is delayed. however, the main 
components are under manufactory and STUK’s 
regulatory control; e.g. the reactor pressure vessel 
was built in Japan and transported to the site at 
the end of 2008 and officially reported on 4 January 
2009 as the first record of the OL3 safeguards di-
ary. TVO prepared a draft for the Basic Technical 
Characteristics (BTC) of the new unit in 2008. This 
draft was reviewed by STUK, the IAEA, and the 
Commission twice in 2008. Thus, the inspectorates 
have the possibility to plan the surveillance and 
containment measures in advance. Future actions 
were, during 2009, waiting for the advancement of 
the construction of the fuel handling buildings. The 
official BTC is due at least 200 days before the first 
consignment of nuclear material is to be received. 
The commissioning of the OL3 unit is postponed 
until 2012.
On the basis of its own assessment as well as 
IAEA and Commission inspection results, STUK 
concluded that TVO’s Olkiluoto NPP has complied 
with its nuclear safeguards obligations in 2009.
3.1.4 The VTT FiR1 research reactor site
In 2009, STUK approved the VTT FiR1 research 
reactor’s updated nuclear materials handbook and 
one new person to be appointed responsible for 
nuclear safeguards at the facility. In 2009 STUK 
also granted to VTT a license to import plutonium 
standards material from the IAEA.
Safeguards inspectors from STUK and the 
European Commission verified the nuclear mate-
rial inventory of VTT on 3 June 2009. There were 
some rounding and timing inconsistencies in re-
porting but the nuclear material inventory was 
concluded to be correct. STUK remarked that the 
operator shall update the nuclear materials hand-
book to cover the bookkeeping and reporting of 
nuclear items and equipment.
The IAEA carried out complementary access 
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to the VTT site on 4 June 2009, one day after the 
physical inventory verification (PIV), to confirm the 
absence of undeclared activities. Most likely this 
was to confirm the fact that there were significant 
changes in the building surrounding the research 
reactor as indicated on the updated declaration. 
The university part of the building was fully reno-
vated and the former hot cells located in that part 
of the building were demolished.
The IAEA or the Commission did not have any 
clarification requests based on their inspection. The 
inventory of nuclear materials at the FiR1 research 
reactor in the end of 2009 is presented in Table 3 
(Appendix 1). On the basis of its verification and 
assessment, STUK could conclude that the VTT 
FiR1 research reactor facility has complied with its 
nuclear safeguards obligations in 2009. however, 
the continuous need to remark on the exact compli-
ance with the safeguards procedures as defined in 
the manuals is noticed.
3.1.5 Minor nuclear material holders
In 2009 STUK granted an operation license to 
OMg Kokkola Chemicals for producing, storing 
and handling natural uranium as a by-product of 
their cobalt purification process. STUK also ap-
proved one new person to be appointed responsible 
for nuclear safeguards at the facility.
The Nuclear Materials Section of STUK ap-
proved a new person and a deputy to be appointed 
responsible for nuclear safeguards at STUK.
In 2009 STUK inspected the reports from the 
minor nuclear material holders. The international 
inspectorates did not make other types of inspec-
tions to the minor holders.
On the basis of its assessment, STUK concluded 
that the minor nuclear material holders have com-
plied with their nuclear safeguards obligations in 
2009.
3.1.6 The final disposal facility
In 2009, STUK approved a person to be appointed 
responsible for nuclear construction at the facility 
for final disposal of spent nuclear fuel. This person 
is also responsible for facilitating the safeguards 
arrangement at the facility. STUK also approved 
one new person to be appointed responsible for nu-
clear safeguards at the final disposal facility.
In order to confirm that the excavated under-
ground space corresponds to documentation, STUK 
carried out three regular on-site inspections at the 
underground premises of Posiva’s Onkalo facility 
in 2009. The IAEA and the European Commission 
participated as observers in one of these on-site in-
spections. The purpose of these visits was to famil-
iarise the international inspectorates with Posiva’s 
and STUK’s non-proliferation activities for Onkalo 
and with their approaches to the future safeguards 
for final disposal. Particular attention was paid to 
the micro seismic monitoring system verifying the 
absence on undeclared underground activities in 
the vicinity of the repository.
STUK has declared the Onkalo project within 
article 2a(x) of the Additional Protocol to the 
Safeguards Agreement since 2004. The Commission 
assigned the Material Balance Area (MBA) code 
W0LF to Onkalo in January 2008. Moreover, fol-
lowing the development of the Design Information 
Questionnaire (DIQ) for the encapsulation plant 
and the geological repository at the IAEA in 2008, 
the Commission prepared the Annex h-I of the 
safeguards regulation – adopted for the geological 
repository – for the Basic Technical Characteristics 
(BTC) in 2009.
Posiva updated its non-proliferation handbook 
in March 2009 to clarify and update the descrip-
tions of some of Posiva’s practices. however, this 
update did not consider the need to prepare the 
early Design Information as indicated by the IAEA 
and the Commission. Therefore, the update was 
not accepted by STUK. As a consequence, STUK 
Figure 7. Complementary Access to verify the absence 
of previously declared activities after the dismantling 
of nuclear activities.
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carried out a system inspection on 13 October 2009 
and remarked Posiva upon a few organisational 
and technical descriptions, to be re-written in 
the handbook. Besides, several meetings were ar-
ranged between the Finnish and Swedish parties 
and the Commission and the IAEA during the year 
2009 in order to clarify and facilitate safeguards 
measures for the final disposal of spent nuclear 
fuel. Finally in December, STUK forwarded the 
Basic Technical Characteristics prepared by Posiva 
to the Commission in order to facilitate the imple-
mentation of the IAEA safeguards approaches.
3.1.7 Nuclear dual use items, export licenses
In 2009 the Ministry for Foreign Affairs issued 
two licences for exporting nuclear software to the 
Russian Federation and one to Algeria, one for 
transferring nuclear material to the IAEA and the 
other to transferring nuclear technology (nuclear 
information) to germany.
3.1.8 Transport of nuclear materials
In 2009, fresh nuclear fuel was imported to Finland 
from Spain, Sweden, germany and the Russian 
Federation (Table 1). In relation to these imports, 
STUK approved four transport plans and inspect-
ed two transports of fresh nuclear fuel. A small 
amount of spent nuclear fuel was transported 
in Finland in 2009 and for that operation STUK 
granted a licence and approved a transport plan. 
The transport was also inspected. Furthermore, 
STUK approved three package designs for pack-
ages to be used in transports of fissile material.
3.1.9 International transfers of 
nuclear material
In 2009, TVO reported to STUK about its inter-
national fuel contracts, fuel transfers and fuel 
shipments. STUK carried out an on-site inspec-
tion where TVO’s nuclear material accountancy 
on the fresh fuel imported in 2009 was verified 
against the original shipment documents cover-
ing the international transfers. The accountancy 
of the natural uranium in TVO’s possession but 
storied outside of the Olkiluoto NPP site was also 
inspected. Based on the findings, STUK concluded 
that TVO has complied with its safeguards obliga-
tions in purchasing the nuclear fuel and managing 
its international transfers.
3.2 International developments 
in safeguards
In the international nuclear safeguards develop-
ment fora, one major topic during the year 2009 was 
the beginning of the IAEA Integrated Safeguards 
in Europe. The roles, responsibilities and practices 
of the three levels of safeguards in place within 
the EU: those of the IAEA, those of the European 
Commission and those of the EU Member States 
were discussed in a constructive atmosphere, with 
the objective of enhancing cooperation and improv-
ing cost efficiency. The amendments in the Russian 
nuclear regulation also reflected on the Finnish-
Russian cooperation programme and on interna-
tional relations in a constructive manner.
STUK contributed to the work of IAEA’s Standing 
Advisory group on Safeguards Implementation 
(SAgSI) in 2009 by having a member in SAgSI. 
Safeguards implementation issues considered 
by SAgSI during the year included Integrated 
Safeguards issues, furthering the state level safe-
guards concept, cooperation with State Systems of 
Accounting for and Control (SSAC), strategic plan-
ning, future Safeguards Implementation Report, 
and	a	safeguards	R&D	plan.
In 2009 STUK continued its participation in the 
European Safeguards Research and Development 
Association’s (ESARDA) working groups and the 
steering committee meeting. STUK contributed 
to the 31st Annual Meeting of ESARDA in Vilnius, 
Lithuania with a large delegation and several pres-
Figure 8. Presidents of ESARDA at the annual meeting: 
Göran Dahlin (Past-President), Elina Martikka (Presi-
dent), Kristof Horvath (Vice-President), Jerome Joly 
(Past-President).
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entations. STUK also participated in the ESARDA 
Executive Board meetings in 2009. At the begin-
ning of 2009 STUK’s representative started her 
two-year term as the President of ESARDA (see 
Fig. 8). Based on the concepts of Short Notice, 
Unannounced Inspections and Complementary 
Access, the term “SNUICA” inspector for the on-
alert safeguards inspector was introduced at the 
Integrated Safeguards Working group meeting in 
Stockholm, Sweden 21–22 April 2009 by STUK.
In 2009, the group of experts for Application of 
Safeguards to geological Repositories (ASTOR) 
met at the IAEA in Vienna in June. The IAEA 
had finally prepared the Integrated Safeguards 
Approach and Design Information Questionnaire 
documents for conditioning plants and geologi-
cal repositories. These documents form the basis 
for safeguarding the final disposal of spent nu-
clear fuel. Novel technologies to be applied for 
safeguards purposes at this new type of facility 
were presented and discussed during the meeting. 
Two trilateral meetings between the IAEA, the 
European Commission, Finland, and Sweden on 
the implementation of safeguards for geological 
repositories were held in Vienna on 24 June and on 
5 November 2009.
3.3 Bilateral cooperation and 
peer-to-peer exchanges 
strengthen regional security
Finland’s bilateral cooperation programmes in the 
area of non-proliferation are directed mainly to-
wards our neighbouring countries outside the EU 
and are motivated by the continued need for en-
hancement of the regional security environment. 
Accordingly, STUK continued its cooperation pro-
gramme with the Russian Federation in 2009. 
The focus in 2009 was on the cooperation with 
the Russian nuclear security and safeguards au-
thorities, mainly through peer-to-peer exchanges. 
Collaboration with Ukraine in mutually beneficial 
areas was re-established in 2008 and an agree-
ment about a programme was made between the 
State Nuclear Regulatory Committee of Ukraine 
(SNRCU) and STUK. The focus in 2009 was on 
the construction of the Mobile Measurement 
Laboratory to be used by SNRCU.
STUK also participated in the tasks of the coop-
eration programme between the Swedish Radiation 
Safety Authority (SSM) and the Ukraine authori-
ties including the SNRCU. Experts from STUK 
participated in the review and development of the 
national system of nuclear material accountancy 
and control and in the non-proliferation education 
programme in Ukraine.
3.3.1 Cooperation with the 
Rostechnadzor, Russia
The cooperation programme with the Russian 
Federation includes the review of Russian norms 
and guidelines, technical visits to exchange expe-
riences in the implementation of the new norms 
and the provision of measurement and information 
technology.
The scope of the work covered physical inven-
tory taking, the evaluation of the results and the 
assessment of the effectiveness of the nuclear regu-
latory authority of Russia Rostechnadzor’s supervi-
sion. In addition, the measurement programmes 
of the I Rosenergoatom for radioactive substances 
and waste, as well as the associated quality control 
programmes were reviewed. The reviewed docu-
ments, except the one dealing with the assessment 
of the effectiveness of supervision, are by now final-
ized.
The demonstration of the spent fuel attribute 
tester (SFAT) measurement device for the Rostech-
nadzor was successfully carried out in November 
2008 at the Kola nuclear power plant. The de-
vice was returned, as planned, to the Security 
Technology Laboratory at STUK and is now being 
tested and prepared for shipment to the Ozersk 
Office of the Rostechnadzor to be used at the 
Mayak reprocessing facility.
STUK, together with Rostechnadzor, visited the 
RADON radioactive waste management and stor-
age complex near Moscow. The safety, security as 
well as material accountancy and control measures 
at such a large industrial processing and storage 
facility were of particular interest during the visit. 
Similar visit in Finland will be organized in the 
coming year.
STUK participated in the 4th Russian Inter-
national Conference on Nuclear Material Pro-
tection, Control and Accountancy in Obninsk in 
October 2009. The conference was convened to 
review the progress achieved during US-Russia 
co-operation programme, which is approaching its 
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completion. There was, however, a shared under-
standing that international cooperation must con-
tinue to ensure the sustainability of past work and 
the mutually beneficial cooperation in the future.
3.3.2 The programme with Ukraine: 
delivery of mobile laboratory
STUK’s cooperation programme with Ukraine for 
the next 2–3 year period includes activities and 
tasks in the following areas:
•	 assessment	of	regulatory	documents	in	the	area	
of nuclear safeguards and nuclear material se-
curity, including physical protection;
•	 specification	of	ways	and	technical	means	which	
will enable reliable and efficient monitoring and 
investigation of incidents involving nuclear or 
other radioactive materials or waste (mobile 
laboratory);
•	 support	of	the	development	of	nuclear	material	
fuel verification capacity of the Ukraine nation-
al nuclear safeguards system, particularly for 
spent fuel;
•	 information	 technology	 support	 for	 building	
inspector capacity in the areas of nuclear safe-
guards and security, including physical protec-
tion;
•	 coordinated	 support	 for	 establishment	 of	 a	
functional web-based information portal for 
the State Nuclear Regulatory Committee of 
Ukraine.
During 2009 the focus was on manufacturing and 
delivering a Mobile Laboratory vehicle for the use 
of the State Nuclear Regulatory Committee of 
Ukraine (SNRCU). Subsequently, by the end of the 
year, the experts from the IAEA, Ukraine, Sweden, 
and the European Commission were getting ac-
quainted with its technical, functional and opera-
tive features at STUK. The Mobile Laboratory is by 
now ready and will be provided to the Authorities 
in Ukraine via IAEA during the year 2010.
Within the information technology support 
task, the Electronic Performance Support System 
(EPSS) for inspectors was developed and dem-
onstrated to the representatives of SNRCU. The 
required technical documentation was created and 
the task was completed by December 2009. The 
system can also be applied in management of fu-
ture work with training, maintenance and the use 
of the mobile laboratory in Ukraine.
Additionally, STUK participated in the tasks of 
the cooperation programme between Sweden’s SSM 
and the Ukraine authorities, including SNRCU. 
Experts from STUK participated in the review 
and development of the national system of nuclear 
material accountancy and control and in the non-
proliferation education programme activities in 
Odessa in July and in Sevastopol in September 
2009.
3.3.3 Baltic Sea regional workshop 
on illicit nuclear trafficking
The first regional workshop on illicit nuclear 
trafficking was organized by IAEA and STUK in 
hyvinkää, Finland, 8–11 June 2009. The partici-
pants represented police, border and customs au-
thorities from the Baltic Sea countries and from 
Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and Turkey. Repre-
sentatives of the European Commission and the 
Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) partici-
pated as well. During the workshop, IAEA dis-
seminated information about its services that are 
aimed at strengthening the measures used to com-
bat illicit trafficking. The participants exchanged 
experiences in implementing security functions, 
with the particular focus being on cooperation be-
tween different law enforcement authorities. The 
Rostechnadzor, the nuclear regulatory authority of 
Russia, also participated in the workshop.
The workshop proved a success and may well 
result in more concrete collaboration of different 
law enforcement authorities in the region, particu-
larly in the areas of infrastructure development, 
regulatory system enhancement, detection technol-
ogy procurement and application, training exer-
cises, and securing financial support. The results 
have been presented to the CBSS Secretariat in 
Stockholm and will be provided to the relevant par-
ties, including the Expert groups, for their consid-
eration and decisions. The results of the Workshop 
were also reviewed at the IAEA in November 2009 
and will be used in the planning a similar work-
shop in the Black Sea area.
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3.4 The Finnish National Data 
Centre for the Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
3.4.1 International cooperation is the 
foundation of CTBT verification
During 2009 the Finnish National Data Centre 
(FiNDC) participated in meetings of the Working 
group B (WgB) of the Preparatory Commission 
for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
Organization (CTBTO). WgB is a policy making 
organ for the technical development of the veri-
fication regime. By participating in the work of 
WgB and its subsidiaries (workshops and expert 
groups), the FiNDC can provide technical expertise 
to the CTBTO, while also attending to the Finnish 
national interests.
3.4.2 The analysis pipeline is a well 
established daily routine
The FiNDC continued developing its own routine 
monitoring system for the data received from the 
International Monitoring System’s network (IMS). 
The FiNDC routinely analyses all radionuclide 
measurement data generated at the IMS radionu-
clide stations across the world. The IMS network 
is still developing, and the number of operational 
air filter stations was about 58 at the end of 2009 
(at the final stage there will be 80). The operation-
al stations generated approximately 700 gamma 
spectra per day for the FiNDC analysis pipeline 
to handle. The analysis pipeline is linked to the 
LINSSI database and equipped with an automated 
alarm system, to enable efficient and fully auto-
mated screening of the data.
The number of IMS stations equipped with 
xenon measurement capabilities was 21 at the 
end of 2009. Although the IMS xenon systems are 
still working in a preliminary mode, the FiNDC 
analyzes also this data. Xenon measurements are 
especially important for CTBT verification, be-
cause xenon, as a noble gas, often leaks also from 
underground tests, which seldom release particu-
late matter.
3.4.3 The DPRK Test 2010
The underground nuclear test performed by the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) on 
25 May 2010 was readily detected by the CTBT 
network of seismic stations. however, seismic data 
alone cannot give unquestionable proof of the nu-
clear nature of an explosion. This test was well con-
tained and did not release radionuclide particles or 
even gases in such amounts that these would have 
been detected at any IMS station. Nor has any 
other party reported publicly about any such de-
tection. Thus the nuclear nature of this explosion 
can only be deduced from the self declaration of 
the DPRK and the enormous difficulties in achiev-
ing an explosion of this magnitude using chemical 
explosives. If the treaty had been in force, the exact 
nature of the test would almost certainly have been 
revealed during an on-site inspection.
For just over a week after the test FiNDC deliv-
ered daily status reports generated by the CTBTO 
and the FiNDC to our collaborators. This was done 
while key staff was travelling abroad, and succeed-
ed due to fully utilizing the global communications 
networks and our automated analysis tools.
3.4.4 CTBT OSI equipment testing at Onkalo
The On Site Inspection (OSI) division of the 
Provisional Technical Secretariat (PTS) of the 
CTBTO arranged an equipment test exercise at 
Posiva’s Onkalo site and in its vicinity. During the 
exercise, which lasted almost two weeks in July-
August, the PTS was able to test their seismic 
and other ground sensing equipments against the 
explosions of the tunnel construction blasts, which 
resemble the aftershocks of a nuclear test deep in 
the underground. The test was successful and the 
PTS gained valuable experience of their equipment 
and procedures. STUK played an active part in 
establishing contact between the PTS and Posiva 
and thus facilitating the exercise within the CTBT 
framework.
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4 Human resources development
Nuclear safeguards by the Nuclear Materials 
Section of STUK cover all typical measures of a 
State System of Accounting for and Control of 
Nuclear Materials (SSAC), and many other ac-
tivities besides. The nuclear fuel cycle related ac-
tivities, e.g. research and development activities 
not involving nuclear material and manufacture 
of certain equipment as defined it the Additional 
Protocol have enlarged the scope of traditional safe-
guards. Nuclear safeguards on the national level 
are closely linked with other functions of nuclear 
materials control and non-proliferation: licensing, 
export control, border control, transport control, 
combating illicit trafficking, the physical protection 
of nuclear materials, and monitoring compliance 
with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
(CTBT). Continuous analysis of the developments 
in the involved fields of both technology and poli-
tics is a daily, multidisciplinary task at the STUK 
Nuclear Materials Section.
The personnel’s competence is systematically 
developed taking into account the needs of the 
organisation and the wishes of the individuals (see 
Figure 9). Those aiming at an expert’s career are 
valued as highly as those interested in manage-
rial duties. At the Nuclear Materials Section, the 
management participated in the general course for 
managers at government organisations provided 
by the Finnish Institute of Public Management. 
The internal training programme of the section 
continued, and experts participated in a few inter-
national courses. During 2009 the main focus was 
in nuclear forensics and security related training 
courses.
The internal training programme of safeguards 
inspectors at STUK continued in 2009. There 
were a total of eight seminar lectures arranged at 
STUK, where a variety of topics such as nuclear 
security, nuclear material transports and the final 
disposal of spent nuclear fuel were addressed. The 
safeguards inspectors also gave safeguards related 
training to the other STUK inspectors, who work 
mainly with nuclear safety. Moreover, one seminar 
concentrated on the current issues of nuclear non-
proliferation and was held in cooperation with the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
STUK participated in the workshop on human 
Capital Development in Ispra, Italy in September 
2009. The purpose of the meeting was to collect 
information and coordinate training on safeguards 
and non-proliferation issues in the world. This 
joint workshop was organised by the European 
Commission (EC) Joint Research Centre (JRC) 
Ispra and the Department of Energy in the USA. 
JRC and USA have cooperated for a long time 
to combine safeguards and security training for 
all those who need this type of training. In the 
meeting there were about 50 participants from 
USA, China, Japan, Republic of Korea, Belgium, 
Lithuania, Russia, Israel, France, germany, Italy, 
the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and 
Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), the EC and 
the IAEA. In September STUK participated also 
in the “Training session on the detection of illicit 
trafficking of radioactive and nuclear materials” 
at JRC Ispra. The purpose of the meeting was to 
map the Member States needs for nuclear security 
training, for example training for the Customs and 
Border Control officers. The RADAR project to 
educate and train Finnish Custom officers benefits 
from the co-operation established with the Joint 
Research Centre.
Three experts from the Nuclear Materials 
Section participated in a three day training ex-
ercise on detecting and analysing nuclear ma-
terials using gamma spectrometric tools at the 
Institute for Transuranium Elements (ITU) of the 
EC Joint Research Centre (JRC) in Karlsruhe. The 
training was shared with the Security Technology 
Laboratory of STUK and arranged so that the 
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Ms. Elina Martikka Section Head
Mr. Timo Ansaranta Inspector Control of competence at facilities and at small holders
Mr. Tero Varjoranta Director, Nuclear Waste and Materials
Ms. Arja Tanninen Deputy Director Licensing, permits
 
Figure 9. The staff of STUK’s Nuclear Materials Section.
trainees could train with their own equipment. 
This way, the training did not only heighten the 
theoretical knowledge of the group, but greatly en-
hanced the practical ability of the team to respond 
in real situations. 
Later in the year one expert participated in a 
workshop on nuclear forensics at the same insti-
tute. This workshop heightened our awareness of 
tools and methods available for nuclear forensics 
and was a part of setting up the collaboration be-
tween ITU and STUK.
Two STUK experts participated in the IAEA 
International Training Course ITC-21, Physical 
Protection of Nuclear Material and Facilities, at 
the Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, 
NM. The 3-week long training concentrated on the 
systematic performance-based approach to the def-
inition, design and evaluation of the requirements 
for physical protections.
In view of the possible emergency response 
duties, one expert took part in the Empire 2009 
exercise in Albany, Ny as an observer. This exercise 
gave insight into the demands on radiation author-
ities and requirements for working environments 
in a large scale radiological emergency.
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5 Conclusions
The implementation of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) integrated safeguards be-
gan in Finland on 15 October 2008. Thus, the year 
2009 was the first whole year with the new ap-
proach. The number of IAEA inspection days was 
reduced from the approximately 25 person days 
per year of the past to 13. Similarly, the European 
Commission reduced its inspection activities to 14. 
STUK continued with national safeguards meas-
ures and activities with 64 inspection days and 
40 inspections. In order to be present at the short 
notice IAEA inspections, agreed to compensate for 
the reduced number of routine inspections, STUK 
raised preparedness to have a daily on-the-alert 
inspector.
In 2009 STUK performed 15 safeguards inspec-
tions at the Finnish nuclear power plants (NPP), 
six at the Loviisa NPP and nine at the Olkiluoto 
NPP. The Commission and the IAEA took part in 
seven of these inspections. STUK performed three 
non-destructive assay measurement campaigns, 
two at the Loviisa NPP and one at the Olkiluoto 
NPP. At other facilities, STUK performed four safe-
guards inspections, of which the Commission took 
part in the physical inventory verification at the 
VTT research reactor. At the underground research 
premises for the geological repository of spent 
nuclear fuel, STUK performed three safeguards in-
spections, of which the IAEA and the Euratom took 
part in one inspection. The IAEA carried out com-
plementary access to the Olkiluoto nuclear power 
plant site and the VTT research reactor nuclear 
site to verify declared activities and the absence of 
undeclared activities. The IAEA sent its safeguards 
statements to the Commission, which amended 
them with its own conclusions and forwarded them 
to STUK. The conclusions by the Commission were 
in line with the IAEA's remarks as well as STUK’s 
findings; there were no outstanding questions by 
the IAEA or the Commission at the end of 2009.
The results of STUK's nuclear safeguards in-
spection activities continued to demonstrate that 
the Finnish licence holders take good care of their 
nuclear materials. There were no indications of un-
declared materials or activities and the inspected 
materials and activities were in accordance with 
the licence holders’ declarations. STUK remarked 
on the nuclear safeguards systems of one of the li-
cence holders in 2009, requiring them to update the 
descriptions of their nuclear material accountancy 
procedures and control systems for the nuclear 
technology and dual use equipment. The main con-
cern was about the compliance with the reporting 
timelines at the research reactor facility. Neither 
the IAEA nor the Commission made any remarks 
nor did they present any required actions based on 
their inspections. By their nuclear materials ac-
countancy and control systems, all license holders 
enabled STUK to fulfil its own obligations under 
the international agreements relevant to nuclear 
safeguards and non-proliferation. The internation-
al inspectorates – the IAEA and the Commission 
– were able to considerably reduce their inspection 
efforts in Finland.
The purpose of the Finnish chemical, biological, 
radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) Task Force is to 
advance measures to deter, prevent, detect and 
respond to illicit CBRN activities, and to enhance 
coordination and cooperation between national au-
thorities involved in the counter-CBRN effort. For 
example, STUK Nuclear Materials Section cooper-
ates closely with the Finnish Customs to offer ex-
pert advice in development of radiation monitoring 
at borders, including training for Customs officers. 
The International Physical Protection Advisory 
Service (IPPAS) mission provided by the IAEA to 
30
STUK-B 114
Finland made suggestion to improve some prac-
tices. As a consequence of the mission’s recom-
mendations, a new Nuclear Security Section was 
established at the Nuclear Reactor Regulation 
Department of STUK.
A major goal of all current Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) related activities 
is the entry into force of the CTBT itself. To reach 
this goal, major steps have to be taken in the politi-
cal arena, and an important prerequisite for posi-
tive political action is that the verification system 
of the CTBTO is functioning and able to provide 
assurance to all parties that it is impossible to 
make a clandestine nuclear test without getting 
detected. The FiNDC is committed to its own role 
in the common endeavour so that the verification 
system of the CTBTO can accomplish its detec-
tion task. While still incomplete, the verification 
system has already demonstrated its potential for 
detecting nuclear tests. During the year 2009 the 
performance of the system was validated after the 
DPKR test on 25 May 2009.
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7 Abbreviations and acronyms
ADR
European Agreement con-
cerning the International 
Carriage of Dangerous goods 
by Road
AP
Additional Protocol to the 
Safeguards Agreement
AQG
Atomic Questions group of 
the Council of the European 
Union
ASTOR
Application of Safeguards to 
geological Repositories
BTC
Basic Technical 
Characteristics
CA
Complementary Access
CBRN
Chemical, biological, radio-
logical and nuclear (such as 
in “protective measures taken 
against CBRN weapons or 
hazards”)
CdZnTe
Cadmium zinc telluride
CTBT
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-
Ban Treaty
CTBTO
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-
Ban Treaty Organization
DIQ
Design Information 
Questionnaire
DIV
Design Information 
Verification
DU
Depleted uranium
eFORK
enhanced FORK with a 
CdZnTe-gamma spectrometer 
(see FORK)
ES
Environmental Sampling
ESARDA
European Safeguards 
Research and Development 
Association
EU
European Union
FA
(1) Facility Attachment ac-
cording to the Safeguards 
Agreement (INFCIRC/193), 
(2) Fuel Assembly
FiNDC
Finnish National Data 
Centre for the CTBT
FINSP
Finnish Support Programme 
to the IAEA Safeguards
FORK
Spent fuel verifier with gross 
gamma and neutron detec-
tion
GBUV
gamma Burnup Verifier
GICNT
global Initiative for 
Combating Nuclear 
Terrorism
HEU
high-enriched uranium
HPGe
high-Purity germanium
IAEA
International Atomic Energy 
Agency
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IMS
International Monitoring 
System (of the CTBTO)
INFCIRC
Information Circular 
(IAEA document type, eg. 
INFCIRC/193, Safeguards 
Agreement, or INFCIRC/140, 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty)
IPPAS
International Physical 
Protection Advisory Service
IS
Integrated Safeguards
ISSAS
International SSAC Advisory 
Service
ITWG
International Technical 
Working group for combating 
illicit trafficking of nuclear 
and other radioactive materi-
als
KMP
Key Measurement Point
LINSSI
an SQL database for gamma-
ray spectrometry
MBA
Material Balance Area
MEE
Ministry of Employment and 
the Economy
NDA
Non-Destructive Assay
NM
Nuclear Material
NPP
Nuclear Power Plant
NPT
The Treaty on the Non-
proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (INFCIRC/140, 
“Non-Proliferation Treaty”)
NSG
Nuclear Suppliers’ group
Onkalo
Underground rock character-
isation facility (for the final 
disposal of spent nuclear 
fuel)
PIV
Physical Inventory 
Verification
PSP
Particular Safeguards 
Provisions
PTS
Provisional Technical 
Secretariat (to the 
Preparatory Commission of 
the CTBT)
Pu
Plutonium
RL07
Radionuclide Laboratory to 
the CTBT hosted by STUK 
(FIL07)
SA
Subsidiary Arrangements
SAGSI
Standing Advisory group on 
Safeguards Implementation
SFAT
Spent Fuel Attribute Tester
SNRCU
State Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission of Ukraine
SNRI
Short Notice Random 
Inspection
SNUICA
Short notice, unannounced 
inspection, complementary 
access on-alert inspector
SSAC
State System of Accounting 
for and Control of Nuclear 
Materials
SSM
Swedish Radiation Safety 
Authority
Th
Thorium
U
Uranium
UI
Unannounced Inspection
UNSC
United Nations Security 
Council
VTT
Technical Research Centre of 
Finland
WGB
Working group B (of the 
CTBTO)
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Table 1. Summary of nuclear material receipts and shipments in 2009.
To From FA LEU (kg) Pu (kg)
W0L1 Spain 116 20 526 –
W0L1 Germany 8 1 389 –
W0L2 (1/2) Sweden 60 10 373 –
W0L2 (2/2) Sweden 56 9 682 –
W0LS W0L1 41 6 777 59
W0LS W0L1 41 6 775 59
W0LS W0L1 41 6 773 59
W0LS W0L2 41 6 887 61
W0LS W0L2 41 6 869 61
W0LS W0L2 41 6 859 61
WL0V Russian Federation 72 9 070 –
 W0L1, W0L2 & W0LS = Olkiluoto NPP, WL0V = Loviisa NPP, FA = fuel assembly; LEU = low-enriched uranium, Pu = plutonium.  
 Note: W0L1 and W0L2 shipments are marked only once into the table as W0LS receipts.
APPENDIX 1 Nuclear materials in Finland in 2009
Table 2. Fuel assemblies at 31 December 2009.
MBA FA/SFA *) LEU (kg) Pu (kg)
WL0V 4 671/3 973 540 476 4 809
W0L1 1 083/501 185 473 745
W0L2 1 133/559 189 554 818
W0LS 6 150/6 150 1042 712 8 709
MBA = material balance area, FA = fuel assembly, SFA = spent fuel assembly
*) FAs in core are accounted as fresh fuel assemblies  
(Loviisa 313 FAs and Olkiluoto 500 FAs per reactor)
Table 3. Total amounts of nuclear material at 31 December 2008.
MBA natural U (kg) LEU/HEU (kg) DU (kg) Plutonium (kg) Thorium (kg)
WL0V – 540 477 – 4 809 –
W0L1 – 185 521 – 745 –
W0L2 – 189 593 – 818 –
W0LS – 1042 712 – 8 709 –
WRRF 1 511 60.1 0.002 – –
WFRS 44.7 1.4 1023 0.003 2.5
WKK0 2 250 – – – –
WHEL 41.2 0.3 20.0 0.003 3.0
Minor holders 0.2 0.00116 997 < 0.01 0.142
MBA = material balance area, WRRF = VTT FiR-1/VTT Processes, WFRS = STUK, WKK0 = OMG Kokkola Chemicals, WHEL =  Laboratory of Radiochemistry at the 
University of Helsinki, U = uranium, LEU = low-enriched uranium, HEU = high-enriched uranium, DU = depleted uranium.
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APPENDIX 2 IAEA, European Commission and STUK 
safeguards field activities in 2009 in Finland
Table 4. IAEA, Commission and STUK safeguards inspections on site.
General information Inspections Inspection  person days
MBA Date Inspection type IAEA COM STUK IAEA COM STUK
WL0V, Loviisa site 3 March Routine inspection + site (verification of declaration) 0 0 1 0 0 3
ONKALO 3 March As built DIV 0 0 1 0 0 2
W0L1,W0L2, W0LS, 
Olkiluoto site 4 March
Routine inspection + site 
(verification of declaration) 0 0 3 0 0 6
W0LS 18 March SNRI 1 1 1 1 1 1
VTT site 19 March Site (verification of declaration) 0 0 1 0 0 1
HYRL site 24 March Site (verification of declaration) 0 0 1 0 0 1
STUK site 25 March Site (verification of declaration) 0 0 1 0 0 1
W0L1,W0L2 28–29 April Pre-PIV W0L1, W0L2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Olkiluoto site 29 April Complementary Access (CA) 1 1 1 1 1 1
W0L1 9 May CV 0 0 1 0 0 1
W0L2 27 May CV 0 0 1 0 0 1
W0L1, W0L2, W0LS 2–4 June Post-PIV (W0L1, W0L2) and PIV (W0LS) 3 3 3 3 3 3
WFRS 2 June PIV 0 1 1 0 1 1
WRRF 3 June PIV 0 1 1 0 1 1
VTT site 4 June Complementary Access (CA) 1 1 1 2 1 1
ONKALO 12 June As built DIV 0 0 1 0 0 2
WL0V 23 June Routine inspection 0 0 1 0 0 1
WL0V 18 August Pre-PIV 1 1 1 1 1 1
WL0V 31 August. CV of LO1 0 0 1 0 0 1
WL0V 21 September CV of LO2 0 0 1 0 0 1
TVO Helsinki Office 25 September  TVO’s international transfers NMAC inspection 0 0 1 0 0 2
WL0V 6–7 October Post-PIV 1 1 1 2 2 2
W0L1, W0L2, W0LS 12 October Routine inspection 0 0 3 0 0 3
ONKALO 13 October As built DIV + system inspection 0 0 2 0 0 3
W0L2 18 November SNRI 1 1 1 1 1 1
TRANPORT INSPECTIONS
TVO Olkiluoto 2 March Transport inspection 0 0 1 0 0 2
TVO Olkiluoto 17 December Transport inspection 0 0 1 0 0 1
NDA MEASUREMENTS
WL0V 24 March FORK 0 0 1 0 0 2
W0L2 15–17 April GBUV 0 0 1 0 0 9
WL0V 19–20 August SFAT + ES 0 0 2 0 0 6
TOTAL 11 13 40 13 14 64
Note: At the Olkiluoto NPP, inspections are counted per MBA. MBA = material balance area, PIV = Physical Inventory Verification, CA = Complementary Access,  
ES = Environmental Sampling, NM = nuclear material, SFAT/eFORK/GBUV = methods of non-destructive assay.
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APPENDIX 3 International agreements and national 
legislation relevant to nuclear safeguards in Finland
Valid legislation, treaties and agreements concern-
ing safeguards of nuclear materials and other nu-
clear items at the end of 2009 in Finland (Finnish 
Treaty Series, FTS):
1. The Nuclear Energy Act, 11 December, 1987/990 
as amended.
2. The Nuclear Energy Decree, 12 February, 
1988/161 as amended.
3. The Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons INFCIRC/140 (FTS 11/70).
4. The Agreement with the Kingdom of Belgium, 
the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal Republic 
of germany, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the 
grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom 
of Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy 
Community and the International Atomic En-
ergy Agency in Implementation of Article III, 
(1) and (4) of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (INFCIRC/193), 14 September 
1997. Valid for Finland from 1 October 1995.
5. The Protocol Additional to the Agreement be-
tween the Republic of Austria, the Kingdom of 
Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal 
Republic of germany, the hellenic Republic, Ire-
land, the Italian Republic, the grand Duchy of 
Luxembourg, the Kingdom of Netherlands, the 
Portuguese Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the 
Kingdom of Sweden, the European Atomic En-
ergy Community and the International Atomic 
Energy Agency in Implementation of Article iii, 
(1) and (4) of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons, 22 September 1998. Entered 
into force on 30 April 2004.
6. The Treaty establishing the European Atom-
ic Energy Community (Euratom Treaty), 25 
March 1957:
•	 Regulation	No	5,	amendment	of	the	list	in	
Attachment VI, 22 December 1958
•	 Regulation	No	9,	article	197,	point	4	of	the	
Euratom Treaty, on determining concentra-
tions of ores, 2 February 1960.
7. Commission Regulation (Euratom) No 302/2005, 
8 February 2005
8. Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 setting up 
a Community regime for the control of exports, 
transfer, brokering, and transit of dual use 
items.
9. The Agreement with the government of the 
United Kingdom of great Britain and Northern 
Ireland and the government of the Republic of 
Finland for Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses 
of Atomic Energy (FTS 16/69). Articles I, II, III 
and X expired on 20 February 1999.
10. The Agreement with the government of the 
Russian Federation (the Soviet Union signed) 
and the government of the Republic of Finland 
for Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic 
Energy (FTS 39/69). Articles 1, 2, 3 and 11 ex-
pired on 1.12.2004.
11. The Agreement between the government of 
the Kingdom of Sweden and the government of 
the Republic of Finland for Co-operation in the 
Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy 580/70 (FTS 
41/70). Articles 1, 2 and 3 expired on 5.9.2000.
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12. The Agreement between Sweden and Finland 
concerning guidelines on export of nuclear ma-
terials, technology and equipment (FTS 20/83).
13. The Agreement between the government of Re-
public of Finland and the government of Cana-
da and Canada concerning the uses of nuclear 
materials, equipment, facilities and information 
transferred between Finland and Canada (FTS 
43/76). Substituted to the appropriate extent by 
the Agreement with the government of Canada 
and the European Atomic Energy Community 
(Euratom) in the peaceful Uses of Atomic En-
ergy, 6 October 1959 as amended.
14. The Agreement on implementation of the Agree-
ment with Finland and Canada concerning the 
uses of nuclear materials, equipment, facilities 
and information transferred between Finland 
and Canada (FTS 43/84).
15. The Agreement between the government of Re-
public of Finland and the government of Aus-
tralia concerning the transfer of nuclear mate-
rial between Finland and Australia (FTS2/80). 
Substituted to the appropriate extent by the 
Agreement between the government of Aus-
tralia and the European Atomic Energy Com-
munity concerning transfer of nuclear material 
from Australia to the European Atomic Energy 
Community.
16. The Agreement for Cooperation with the gov-
ernment of the Republic of Finland and the 
government of the United States concerning 
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (FTS 37/92). 
Substituted to the appropriate extent by the 
Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses 
of Nuclear Energy with European Atomic En-
ergy Community and the USA.
17. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
(FTS 15/2001). This treaty was ratified by Fin-
land in 2001, but will not enter into force before 
it is ratified by all 44 states listed in Annex II of 
the treaty.
